In the weeks prior
to the 6 November 2011 district council elections, representatives from NDI and
Victor Perton , the Commissioner to the Americas from the Victorian
Government of Australia met with members of the political parties, the
judiciary, academia and the press to discuss the overall political environment
in Hong Kong.
On the day of the
district council elections, representatives from NDI together with the Hong
Kong Human Rights Monitor observed campaign activities and polling
throughout the region and spoke with candidates. Following the 25 March 2012
chief executive election, NDI representatives met with many of the same
individuals.
On 21 April 2012,
NDI together with Hong Kong University’s Center for Comparative and Public
Law and the Consulate General of Canada in Hong Kong co-sponsored a
public forum where several well-known commentators and political party leaders
discussed their views on Hong Kong politics in light of the recent chief
executive election.
Promise of Democratization Report 15
The findings of these
visits, monitoring and consultations were documented in:
·
The
Promise of Democratization in Hong Kong: A Divisive Campaign Season: Hong Kong’s 2011 District Council Elections,
2012 Chief Executive Election and The Challenges Ahead. NDI Hong Kong
Report No. 15. 1 July 20121.
This report was
compiled by:
·
David
Caragliano , NDI Senior Program Officer, Asia, principal author;
·
Peter
Manikas , NDI Asia Regional Director, principal editor;
·
Tom
Barry , Deputy Regional Director, principal editor;
·
Marjan
Ehsassi , Senior Program Manager, Asia, principal editor.
In addition:
·
Stephen
Tong assisted with meeting coordination;
·
Malte
Kaeding assisted with the sections of the report dealing with the November 2011
district council elections.
NDI received input
that contributed to this report from individuals with the following
affiliations: The Civic Party, The Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and
Progress of Hong Kong, The Democratic Party, The Hong Kong Confederation of
Trade Unions, The Labor Party, The Liberal Party, The New People’s Party, The
People Power Party, The Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, The
Electoral Affairs Commission, The Hong Kong Bar Association, The Hong Kong
Human Rights Monitor, The Hong Kong Journalists Association, The Hong Kong
Transition Project at Hong Kong Baptist University and SynergyNet.
Focus of the report
This report is the fifteenth in that series.
It focuses on the November 2011 district council elections and March 2012 chief
executive election.
Through this series of reports, entitled “The
Promise of Democratization,” NDI has sought to raise awareness of the
challenges and the progress toward “universal suffrage,” which is set forth as
the “ultimate aim” in Hong Kong’s Basic Law.
Key
findings of the report
The key findings of this report were:
The importance of Public Opinion
Public opinion played an unprecedented role in
the 2012 CE election. In the months immediately preceding the election,
academia and media outlets released weekly public opinion polls rating the
candidates (Page 15).
Other signs point to a strategy on the part of
Beijing to invite the EC to consider each candidate’s acceptability to the Hong
Kong people.
As early as July 11, 2011, Wang Guangya, the
director of the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, took the
opportunity to spell out Beijing’s criteria for the next CE during a visit with
the FTU. Wang set forth three criteria:
(1) love of country and of Hong Kong;
(2) a very high capacity for governance; and
(3) broad acceptability by the people of Hong
Kong.
The new addition of “broad acceptability to
the people of Hong Kong” acknowledges that public opinion should affect CE
electability (Page 16).
Two key developments
will likely stand out in the minds of Hong Kong people when they recall the
March 25, 2012 CE election:
·
One is Beijing’s
unexplained announcement in July 2011 of a new “public acceptability” criterion
to guide the selection of Hong Kong’s next chief executive.
·
The second is Hong
Kong University pollster, Robert Chung’s mock on-line election, allowing Hong Kong
people to have a voice (if not a vote) in the process (Page 14).
The opportunity to use public opinion as a
tool to influence the political process
Beijing’s nod to public opinion and the
enhanced level of competition among three candidates created additional space
for civil society to influence the political process (Page 2 and Page 18).
Robert CHUNG’s
response to the 2012 Chief Executive
Election
In respect of the March 2012 Chief Executive Election:
·
Rather than conduct
a public opinion poll, collating the views of a sample of a few hundred
citizens over the phone, Hong Kong University Professor Robert Chung sought to
solicit public input.
·
His mock election
exercise, organized in the face of harsh criticism from the pro-government
media, was held two days before the actual chief executive election committee
vote.
·
Citizens registered
for the referendum using their Hong Kong identification cards and could vote at
an online website or through a mobile phone application.
·
Participants could
cast their ballots for any one of the three candidates, or they could vote to
abstain—effectively an affirmative vote for none of the candidates.
·
Nearly 223,000
citizens, or approximately 5 percent of Hong Kong’s registered voting
population, turned out to vote in the referendum, and about 55 percent of them
voted to abstain.
·
Chung’s referendum
laid bare the shortcomings of the chief executive selection process. The
turnout revealed a significant number of Hong Kong people frustrated by the
limited options presented by their political system (Page 2)
Hong Kong University professor and pollster
Robert Chung announced late in 2011 that he would try to arrange a mock
referendum based on the CE election.
Rather than conduct a public opinion polling
exercise and solicit the views of a sample of a few hundred citizens over the
phone, Chung sought to extend the voting experience more broadly (Page 19).
Pro-Beijing media outlets sharply criticized
Robert Chung and the referendum project, but the exercise seemed to proceed as
planned until the day of the referendum, when two hackers blocked access to the
online site (Page 19).
Complaints
of foreign interference
From December 2011 through the date of the
referendum exercise, more than 90 critical articles and commentaries were
published making inflammatory claims against Robert Chung. Chung was accused of
“liaising with British intelligence” and performing on cue for his “American
masters.”
Apparently, these criticisms did not have
traction with a sizable segment of the Hong Kong population (Page 20).
Denial by the NDI of involvement with Robert
Chung in the Civil Referendum project
Footnote 49 on Page 20 ‘denies’ NDI involvement in the Civil
Referendum project as follows:
“An article in Wen Wei Po criticized Robert Chung for the
fact that he has accepted funding from NDI. See黎子珍 < 指点江山：钟庭耀是一个政治掮客
> 《香港文匯報》 2012-02-09.
While Professor Chung has collaborated with
NDI on public opinion polling projects in the past, NDI did not provide funding
or technical support in connection with the 3.23 Civil Referendum project”.
IV. The March 2012
Chief Executive Selection Process
The events of 2003 led to Tung’s ouster.
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) spread to Hong Kong from Mainland
China. This health emergency caused around 300 deaths in Hong Kong, widespread
illness and panic. Central Government Authorities initially regarded SARS as a
state secret impeding public awareness and containment of the virus. At about
the same time, the HKSAR government attempted to introduce controversial
national security legislation under Article 23 of the Basic Law. These events
led to popular upsurge of approximately half a million protesters calling for
Tung to step down. The event provided Beijing with a warning on the hazards of
endorsing a CE out of sync with public
opinion. Tung eventually did resign as CE, citing health reasons in March
2005 (Page 14/15).
Article 23
Article 23 of the Basic Law is one of the most
controversial provisions in Hong Kong’s constitution. It provides:
The [HKSAR] shall enact laws on its own to
prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the
Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign
political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the
Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from
establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.
The implementation of Article 23 in a way that
is acceptable to Beijing while respecting the rights and freedoms of the Hong
Kong people has been one of the most difficult challenges faced by the Hong
Kong government. The push to pass Article 23 legislation in 2003 led to a
demonstration of more than half a million Hong Kong people. The government was
compelled to withdraw the bill from the legislature. The legacy of “people
power” is now part of Hong Kong politics. (Page 24).
The Hong Kong government will have to wrestle
with the difficulties of drafting Article 23 legislation in the near future.
Public opinion, both local and international, should inform the debate.
Concerns about certain vague clauses in the original bill hinge, in part, upon
the autonomy of the HKSAR government and the independence of the judiciary
(Page 25).
Reference
1The Promise of Democratization in Hong Kong: A
Divisive Campaign Season: Hong Kong’s
2011 District Council Elections, 2012 Chief Executive Election and The
Challenges Ahead. NDI Hong Kong Report No. 15. 1 July 2012 Link to all Promise of Democratization Reports
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